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Interest in the cognitive and/or emotional basis of complex decision-making, and the related
phenomenon of emotion-based learning, has been heavily inﬂuenced by the IowaGambling
Task. A number of psychological variables have been investigated as potentially important
in understanding emotion-based learning. This paper reviews the extent to which humans
are explicitly aware of how we make such decisions; the biasing inﬂuence of pre-existing
emotional labels; and the extent to which emotion-based systems are anatomically and
functionally independent of episodic memory. Review of literature suggests that (i) an
aspect of conscious awareness does appear to be readily achieved during the IGT, but as a
relatively unfocused emotion-based “gut-feeling,” akin to intuition; (ii) Several studies have
manipulated the affective pre-loading of IGT tasks, and make it clear that such labeling
has a substantial inﬂuence on performance, an experimental manipulation similar to the
phenomenon of prejudice. (iii) Finally, it appears that complex emotion-based learning
can remain intact despite profound amnesia, at least in some neurological patients, a
ﬁnding with a range of potentially important clinical implications: in the management of
dementia; in explaining infantile amnesia; and in understanding of the possiblemechanisms
of psychotherapy.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last few decades, there has been a growing interest in
the cognitive and/or emotional basis of complex decision-making
(e.g., Bechara et al., 1994; Damasio et al., 1996; Rogers et al., 1999;
Manes et al., 2002; Turnbull et al., 2003; Bowman et al., 2005; Peat-
ﬁeld et al., 2012). This interest was, in large part, inspired by the
well-established ﬁnding that neurological patients with lesions to
ventromesial (VM) frontal lobes often showednormal intelligence,
with near or near-to-normal performance on a range of “execu-
tive” tasks (e.g., Bechara et al., 2000b). However, in spite of these
domains of preservation, such individuals often displayed difﬁ-
culties in learning from past mistakes, with real life manifestations
such as entering repeatedly into inappropriate relationships, and
unsuitable business agreements. Such decisions may immediately
seem rewarding, but typically prove to be counter-productive in
the long run, often leading to career termination and ﬁnancial
losses (Damasio et al., 1991; Bechara et al., 2000a). Notably, such
individuals display failures in using emotional feedback from pre-
vious situations (i.e., the punishing consequences of impulsive
actions) in the guidance of their future choices.
Measuring these decision-making failures in the real-world is
challenging, both ethically and methodologically. The Iowa Gam-
bling Task (IGT) was developed as a simple neuropsychological
tool to tap into such deﬁcits in emotional-processing, which
might be associated with complex decision-making difﬁculties,
as observed in individuals with frontal lobe lesions (Rolls et al.,
1994; Damasio et al., 1996; Lezak et al., 2012). In a poetic turn
of phrase, patients with VM lesions were argued to have “myopia
for the future” (p. 217), where their focus was on the immediate
outcome of decisions, with an apparent indifference to the long-
term consequences of their actions (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara,
2005).
A key element of the recent complex decision-making litera-
ture has been the role of emotion (Bechara et al., 1994; Damasio
et al., 1996; Rogers et al., 1999; Manes et al., 2002), and indeed
its ability to drive emotion-based learning (EBL) during complex
decision-making (Damasio et al., 1996; LeDoux, 1996, 2000; Turn-
bull et al., 2003, 2006). EBL systems are known to facilitate insights
about the possible outcome of complex decisions, based on prior
experience of the emotional consequences of actions, with partic-
ular objects and/or agents (Claparède, 1951; Johnson et al., 1985;
Tranel and Damasio, 1993; Bechara et al., 1994; Damasio et al.,
1996; Rogers et al., 1999; LeDoux, 2000). The role of emotion in
such decision-making is supported by studies of patients withVM
frontal, amygdala, and insular lesions (e.g., Bechara et al., 1997,
1999, 2003; Clark et al., 2008), as well as studies measuring skin-
conductance changes (e.g., Bechara et al., 1996, 1997, 1999; see also
Suzuki et al., 2003). Importantly, (see below) this class of memory
(or learning) appears to be independent of the episodic memory
systems of the medial temporal lobe (Claparède, 1951; Tulving
and Schacter, 1990; Turnbull and Evans, 2006; Evans-Roberts and
Turnbull, 2011).
THE IOWA GAMBLING TASK
The IGT (Bechara et al., 1994) has become the key experimen-
tal paradigm in evaluation of emotion-based decision-making,
especially when humans are faced with emotion-mediated infor-
mation, ambiguous contingencies, and uncertain consequences
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(e.g., Rogers et al., 1999; Manes et al., 2002; Bowman andTurnbull,
2004; Happaney et al., 2004). The IGT has been extraordinar-
ily inﬂuential, with Bechara et al.’s (1994) original paper having
already acquired over 3000 citations on a Google Scholar search
for this paper (November 2013). The spread of inﬂuence is also
remarkably diverse, spanning a range of theoretical, and clini-
cal papers in psychiatry (e.g., Cavedini et al., 2002; Evans et al.,
2005; Must et al., 2006), psychology (e.g., Schmitt et al., 1999; Blair
et al., 2001), neuropsychology (Turnbull and Evans, 2006; Torralva
et al., 2007), and neurology (e.g., Bechara et al., 1999; North and
O’Carroll, 2001; Cavedini et al., 2002; Anderson et al., 2006).
A number of psychological variables have been investigated
as potentially important in understanding the nature of these
EBL systems. The most prominent of these are (i) the extent
to which we are explicitly aware of the basis of such decisions;
(ii) the biasing inﬂuence of pre-existing emotional labels in com-
plex decision making; and (iii) the extent to which EBL systems
are anatomically and functionally independent of episodic mem-
ory systems. Each of these issues are brieﬂy reviewed in this
article.
DECISION-MAKING OUTSIDE AWARENESS
An important element in our understanding of the nature of
emotion-based-learning, and the factors that drive learning on
the IGT in particular, is the question of conscious awareness. The
Iowa group have argued that the IGT is extremely complex in
nature (Damasio, 1994, pp. 205–222), and that participants do
not appear to explicitly understand the contingencies of the game
(Bechara et al., 1994, 1996, 1997, 2000b). In analyzing this issue,
it is important to keep in mind the deﬁnition of “awareness” used
by the original Iowa group (e.g., Bechara et al., 1997) – an issue
which may explain some of the emergent controversies amongst
IGT researchers.
Bechara et al. (1997) explored how participants “conceptual-
ized” the task, by which they appear to have meant the broad
understanding of the contingency values on the IGT, and the types
of (explicit) strategies used on the task. In their study, they asked
participants (patients with VM lesions and neurologically normal
controls) two questions: “(i) Tell me all know about what is going
on in this game? (ii) Tellme how you feel about the game”(Bechara
et al., 1997, p. 1293). In other words, they sought a deﬁnition
of “awareness” which emphasized formal but also general (and,
arguably, rational or cognitive) understanding, as well as broadly
based feelings about the task. An initial phase of task awareness
was labeled as the“hunch” period, where neurotypical participants
experienced conscious, but poorly formed impressions about the
task (Bechara et al., 1997). During this period, neurotypical partic-
ipants reported“liking”or“disliking”certain decks, often guessing
the general contingencies of the decks. During a later phase of
the task, most neurotypicals reached a “conceptual” period –
developing a better awareness of the rewarding nature of the
decks. Notably, after encountering losses on speciﬁc decks, (neu-
rotypical) participants developed pre-decision anticipatory skin
conductance responses (SCRs). While, neurological patients did
not generate these anticipatory SCRs, nor did they tend to enter
the“hunch” period. In the later periods most neurological patients
were unable to shift their pattern of choice away from the “bad”
decks though many did develop a conceptual awareness. How-
ever, Bechara et al. (2000a, p. 301) reported some instances of the
famous “knowing versus doing” dissociation, (ﬁrst noted by Teu-
ber, 1964) where “. . . patients “say” the right thing but “do” the
wrong thing”. Even more paradoxically, they reported that some
neurotypical participants did not reach the conceptual period in
that they did not describe an awareness regarding which decks
were good and which were bad, yet they still made increasingly
advantageous choices over time (Bechara et al., 1996, 1997).
In sum, they appear to suggest that conscious awareness on
the task, and good performance are unrelated. The Iowa group
explained the “unconscious” (unaware) nature of these decisions
in terms of the somatic marker hypothesis (SMH; ; Damasio,
1989a,b, 1994; Damasio et al., 1991, pp. 205–222; Bechara et al.,
2000a), where “bodily” (i.e., extra-cerebral) systems play a role in
facilitating decisions (Bechara et al., 1997). This proposition has
received some experimental support (Bechara et al., 2000a), but
it has also attracted criticism (Tomb et al., 2002; see Dunn et al.,
2006 for a review).
Further support for advantageous decision-making occurring
outside of explicit awareness, might be argued to come from the
“BLINK” task (Peatﬁeld et al., 2012). An analog of the classic IGT,
BLINK is some 25 times faster to complete than the conventional
computerized IGT (Bechara et al., 1999). Here, individual deci-
sions are presumably so rapid that little opportunity arises for
conscious awareness to develop, thus meeting the criteria for “fast
and frugal” decision-making (Gigerenzer, 2004). Notably, in spite
of the rapid response rate on the BLINK paradigm, participants
show IGT-like performance (see Peatﬁeld et al., 2012 for a detailed
discussion of BLINK).
In recent years, Bechara’s claim of advantageous decision-
making outside of awareness has been shaped by a series of papers
which suggest that some forms of conscious awareness are available
to participants on the IGT. The ﬁrst of these more formal inves-
tigations was reported in Maia and McClelland’s (2004) study,
based on a structured questionnaire that assessed participants’
knowledge of the IGT. Maia and McClelland probed the gen-
eral awareness of task contingencies, without asking participants
to specify the cognitive details underlying their understanding.
Importantly, most participants who made advantageous choices,
and thus showed preference for one or more of the decks, also
demonstrated conscious feelings about the decks. Indeed, by the
end of Block 1 (i.e., 20 card selections made) participants were
able to report basic affective properties of decks, and by 50 card
selections, the majority of participants could correctly report
“good” decks. Such understanding would readily correspond to
participants’decision preference (seeMaia andMcClelland, 2004).
Their results suggested that when behaving advantageously,
participants not only had access to some explicit knowledge
about the “goodness” or “badness” of the deck, but also had
reportable knowledge that was well placed to facilitate choice
(Maia and McClelland, 2004, p. 16078). Maia and McClel-
land (2004) therefore claimed that participants playing the IGT
did have access to explicit awareness about the contingencies of
the game. They argued that this resulted from the self-paced
nature of the task, which allowed ample time for deliberative rea-
soning, and also that the outcomes of choices were presented
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in a clear numerical form, which aided explicit tracking and
learning of the incentive nature of each deck (at least to some
degree – though see Peatﬁeld et al., 2012 above). Thus, Maia
and McClelland (2004) posited a degree conscious awareness
of the task in participants, albeit of a different form of aware-
ness to that proposed by Bechara et al. (1997). Indeed, this
difference was captured by asking participants probing questions
about the task, rather than by assessing notoriously difﬁcult-to-
verbalize and general feeling. Therefore, Maia and McClelland’s
(2004) quantitative method successfully examined explicit aware-
ness, but failed to tap affectively mediated qualitative knowledge
(feelings) about the game that may indeed facilitate favorable
choices. Importantly, Maia and McClelland (2004) suggests mul-
tiple source of information might possibly guide the choice during
complex-decisions.
Further, empirical support on the question of awareness, comes
from the work of Bowman et al. (2005). In this study, partici-
pants quantitatively rated the “goodness/badness” of each deck
after each twenty-card block. Bowman et al.’s (2005) data sug-
gested that participants could explicitly report affective evaluation
(i.e., the relative goodness/badness) of the task objects, evenduring
the “pre-hunch” phase (Bechara et al., 1997). In fact, participants
showed obvious awareness of the “valence” of the decks, even fol-
lowing the ﬁrst 20 trials of the task. Other studies (e.g., Evans
et al., 2004; Cella et al., 2007) using the same method of track-
ing task subjective awareness, conﬁrm these original ﬁndings, and
indeed extend them to apsychiatric population (Evans et al., 2005).
However, Turnbull et al. (2007) conﬁrmed, in neurotypicals, that
dissociations do occur between explicit deck ratings and behav-
ioral choices on the IGT – suggesting that participants can and do
actively ignore explicit knowledge regarding the incentive values
of their choices, in favor of implicit emotion-mediated knowledge,
especially in situationswhere varying sources of information come
into conﬂict.
Thus, it appears that explicit (emotion-mediated)-knowledge
of incentive values of choice is available much earlier than orig-
inally claimed by Bechara et al. (1997). This form of awareness
is also a type substantially different in quality to that encountered
during explicit cognitive approaches to decision making (Gilhooly
and Murphy, 2005). The descriptions of these decisions empha-
size the fact that the non-cognitive choices are, in contrast, poorly
formed (“a hunch”) and laden with affect (“a gut feeling”). It is
perhaps this knowledge that subserves the phenomenon that has
been long described as “intuition” (see also Kahneman and Tver-
sky, 1973; Stanovich and West, 2000; Kahneman, 2003; Turnbull
et al., 2003, 2005).
INTUITION?
We are therefore faced with an interesting, and under-investigated,
phenomenon, whereby humans are aided in navigating complex
and uncertain problem-spaces, via the awareness of emotion-
based signals – presumably derived from prior experience of
objects and/or agents. (Kahneman et al., 1982; see Kahne-
man, 2003) have long described the properties of such intuitive
responses as being fast, rapid, explicit, effortless, and emotion-
ally laden. Stanovich and West (2000) have proposed a similar
dichotomy (e.g., Hogarth, 2001; Myers, 2002). Both seek to
discriminate between systems underpinning “intuition” versus
“reasoning” (Kahneman, 2003). One approach (intuition; or Sys-
tem 1) generates an overall and apparently imprecise general
impressionof objects or situations, through an involuntary process
sometimes described as natural assessment (Tversky and Kah-
neman, 1983). This phenomenon emerges without intention or
effort, and could not (they argued) be verbalized explicitly. In
contrast, the reasoning pathway (System 2) is involved when
more formal judgements are made, even if these are not overtly
expressed (Kahneman, 2003; for more on this in relation to the
IGT see Bechara, 2005; Cella et al., 2007; Stocco et al., 2009).
However, such reason-based decisions were always intentional and
explicit.
“Intuitive” is therefore a label which appears to capture a deci-
sion process reﬂecting imprecise and emotion-based impressions.
We have argued that such EBL systems may pre-empt or guide
reason-based choice, when faced with settings involving combina-
tions of a complex problem space; high levels of uncertainty and
ambiguity; and ladenor infusedwith affect. Interestingly, this liter-
ature potentially links to emotion-based systems of the sort found
in psychiatric disorders (Evans et al., 2005), or neurological disor-
ders of emotion regulation (Fotopoulou et al., 2004) – where both
groups show impaired understanding in the form of delusional
beliefs. These affectively laden biases may perhaps appear without
conscious awareness, and lack explicit understanding, even when
producing successful outcomes (Damasio, 1994, pp. 187–189;
Turnbull et al., 2007).
In sum, one form of conscious awareness does appear to
be readily achieved during the IGT, but this is in the sense
of an emotion-based impression: “How much do I like this
object?” (Bowman et al., 2005; Evans et al., 2005), though this may
also explain why Bechara et al. (1997) report that optimal IGT
decision-making operates outside of formal cognitive scrutiny.
PRE-EXISTING AFFECTIVE BIAS ON THE IGT
The IGT is usually regarded as a good simulation of the complexity
of real-world decision-making, given that it involves exploratory
decisions under both risk and ambiguity (e.g., Brand et al., 2007),
with shifting contingencies over time. Although other tasks may
provide a better psychological dissection of the decision-making
processes (e.g., Fellows, 2004; Dunn et al., 2006, 2010; Brand et al.,
2007), the IGT is typically regarded as affording an ecologically rich
and complex problem space (Damasio et al., 1991; Bechara et al.,
1994). Of particular interest is the “balance,” or trade-off, between
cognition and affect, as a measure of adaptive task performance
(e.g.,Manes et al., 2002; Fellows and Farah, 2005; Dunn et al., 2006,
2010; Cassotti et al., 2011). For instance, affective states appear to
especially underpin adaptive decisions in the early “opaque” and
ambiguous period of the IGT, with the latter phase of the task (as
discussed above) more readily informed by conscious awareness
of the incentive properties (e.g.,Maia and McClelland, 2004; Bow-
man et al., 2005; Dunn et al., 2006; Brand et al., 2007; Wagar and
Dixon, 2007; Stocco and Fum, 2008).
What then of the fact that humans are often biased or pre-
disposed – toward objects, even before they ﬁrst encounter
them? And how does this bias shift over time? Notably, the
IGT involves an intrinsic affective shift, where initially learned
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associations require reversal for adaptive behavior on the task
(Fellows and Farah, 2005). In many ways, such pre-existing affec-
tive biases might be regarded as the psychological foundation
of prejudice – for example where humans express a pre-existing
negative evaluation, in the absence of knowledge of the object’s
intrinsic properties (e.g., Allport, 1954/1979). Overcoming such
biases clearly requires reversal of an affectively laden association.
Notably, such social biases are understood to be both com-
mon and well-established, with the potential to linger outside
full awareness (Devine, 1989; Amodio et al., 2003; Gregg et al.,
2006). Indeed, the notion that most objects rapidly and automat-
ically evoke affective states is now well-established (e.g., Zajonc,
1980; LeDoux, 1996; Ito and Urland, 2003; Cunningham et al.,
2004). Therefore, an ecologically valid starting point for the IGT
would be a set of objects which are affectively laden, rather than
neutral.
A relevant distinction, and one often stressed by the social cog-
nition literature, is that affect can be sourced from an evaluation
of the features of the target itself (integral affect), or inﬂuenced by
the background mood state or another unrelated source (inci-
dental affect, Pham et al., 2001; Mussweiler and Bodenhausen,
2002; Finucane et al., 2003). Thus, integral affect may result from
actual, perceived, or even imaginary characteristics of the decision
targets – i.e., with a focus or the object itself. In contrast, incidental
affect is sourced from temporary mood states, trait affective states
(e.g., anxiety), or transferred from other diffuse sources distinct
from the target object (e.g., Cohen et al., 2008).
How might these sources of affect inﬂuence complex decision-
making? It is likely they are incorporated into an online affective
state, which is readily placed to infuse and bias choices (Damasio,
1994; Finucane et al., 2003; Cohen et al., 2008). Here, the literature
is patchy in its coverage. The inﬂuence of “incidental” affect on
judgment and decision-making has been well-studied, suggesting
that there are gains in the ﬂexibility and openness of problem-
solving in positive mood states (e.g., Isen, 2001), and risk-aversion
in states of anxiety (e.g., Raghunathan and Pham, 1999). Indeed,
incidental affect appears to have important impacts on IGT per-
formance (Schmitt et al., 1999; Carter and Smith-Pasqualini, 2004;
Suhr andTsandis, 2007). However, the primacy (e.g., Zajonc, 1980;
LeDoux, 1996) and importance of integral (object biased) affect
for judgement and decision-making has been lesswell-investigated
(Pham et al., 2001; Finucane et al., 2003). Surprisingly, only a
few studies (Hinson et al., 2006; Davies and Turnbull, 2011; Aïte
et al., 2013) have assessed integral affective bias in decision-making
paradigms like the IGT – although questions of this sort are highly
relevant for human social decision-making (e.g., Bechara et al.,
1994).
Notably, real-world social behavior involves encountering
agents and objects that develop, and ultimately come to pos-
sess, ambiguous and ambivalent characteristics (e.g., Cacioppo
and Berntson, 1994; Cunningham et al., 2003). Thus, an
appraisal of a well-known individual (e.g., Tony Blair, Barack
Obama, Lance Armstrong, Edward Snowden) may well evoke
both negative and positive evaluations, potentially resulting
in a net-weighted (heuristic-based) attitude (e.g., Van Har-
reveld et al., 2004). Ecologically rich paradigms such as the
IGT have only recently been employed to examine the impact
of affective biases in complex and dynamic decision-making
(Hinson et al., 2006; Davies and Turnbull, 2011; Aïte et al.,
2013). The following section presents an overview of this
research.
INSIGHTS FROM TASKS INVOLVING AFFECTIVE BIAS
Given the proposed primacy of emotion-based processes (Bechara
et al., 1994, 1997), it is perhaps surprising that only three studies
have examined affective bias within IGT-style decision-making.
While each study uses different variants of the IGT, and a range of
affective biases, the data are broadly consistent – demonstrating
that pre-existing bias readily impacts complex decision-making
(Hinson et al., 2006; Davies and Turnbull, 2011; Aïte et al., 2013).
Using a three-deck variant of the IGT, Hinson et al. (2006)
invoked affective bias, by associating task decks with emo-
tional words, which varied according to deck incentives. In
the incongruent condition, the “good” deck was labeled with
negative words, and “bad” deck labeled with positive words
(with the associations reversed for the congruent condition).
Additionally, a third “neutral” deck was labeled with emotion-
ally neutral words. As one might predict, incongruent affec-
tive bias impaired performance, while congruent bias enhanced
decision-making. Thus, the use of stable emotional land-
marks from the outset of the task readily biased IGT-style
decision-making.
The SCR data collected during the experiments (Hinson et al.,
2006) were used to examine the development of discriminating
anticipatory SCRs. Incongruent affective bias was found to hinder
the development of these physiological markers – with little dis-
crimination in differential SCRs across the three decks. However,
in the congruent condition, these anticipatory markers appeared
to selectively distinguish between bad deck choices from both
good and neutral options. These responses are often viewed as
an index of decision biasing “somatic markers” (Bechara et al.,
1997). However, in this study the somatic signals produced no
causal inﬂuence on decision behavior, merely acting as one index
of adaptive decision-making (Hinson et al., 2006).
Building on these ﬁndings, Davies and Turnbull (2011) investi-
gated features of the classic Gambling Task potentially inﬂuenced
by affective bias – expanding the topic to include features such
as sensitivity to punishment cues (Dalgleish et al., 2004), and the
dynamic tracking and weighting of overall deck attitudes (e.g.,
Van Harreveld et al., 2004; Bowman et al., 2005) that were not
explored in the Hinson et al. (2006) experiments. The Davies
and Turnbull (2011) tasks introduced affective bias using visual
stimuli that were either non-social (International Affective Pic-
ture System; Lang et al., 2001) or more socially salient, in the
form of racially diverse faces (Tottenham et al., 2009). To con-
trol for individual variation, the stimuli were also customized for
each participant, by pre-evaluation. As in the Hinson et al. (2006)
studies, there was a growing preference for selections from the
advantageous decks. Importantly, affective bias altered selection
in both congruent and incongruent conditions; especially both
experiments demonstrated that affective labels impaired selection
behavior speciﬁcally under incongruent conditions. Additionally,
the study (experiment 2) also showed a clear inﬂuence of affective
bias on subjective ratings of task objects over the task.
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This sparks the question of how such decision-making is
changed. Congruency did not inﬂuence shifts from the frequently
punishing decks, nor did it alter preferences for decks with lower
loss frequency. Also, decoupling subjective evaluationdata to abso-
lute deck ratings showed that weighting of deck attitudes were
unaltered by the congruencymanipulation. However, incongruent
association selectively modulated evaluation of the disadvanta-
geous decks. Indeed, consolidating the importance of awareness of
the affective nature of the punishing bad decks, subjective aware-
ness of their incentive nature was strongly associatedwith adaptive
task performance (cf. Maia and McClelland, 2004; Bowman et al.,
2005). Such dissociation between deck ratings suggests that deck
attitudes in general were not inﬂuenced by affective bias. Instead
it appears that sensitivity to accumulating losses is a major driving
force in IGTdecision-making (Christakou et al., 2009;Weller et al.,
2007, 2010; cf. Dunn et al., 2010).
PRE VERSUS POST-DECISIONS
Both of the above studies (i.e., Hinson et al., 2006; Davies and
Turnbull, 2011) introduced affective bias at the decision level. In
contrast, a recent study (Aïte et al., 2013) suggests that placing
affective stimuli during the post-decision (feedback stage) phase of
decision-making also affects performance on IGT.Here, the ability
to make an advantageous choice increases when the emotional
context is congruent with the feedback, while this is impaired
in an incongruent condition. Indeed, facial emotion appears to
carry intrinsic incentive value (Shore and Heerey, 2011); therefore
presenting bias during the feedback phase shouldmodulate the net
decision feedback. For example, providing a reward of $10 with a
smile would provide more positive reinforcement than the same
reward with a fearful face.
The ﬁndings of Aïte et al. (2013) are thus consistent with affec-
tive bias inﬂuencing the decision process via a range of plausible
pathways and mechanisms – both affective and cognitive (e.g.,
Hinson et al., 2002, 2006; Dunn et al., 2006, 2010). Incongruent
affective bias again leads to a robust impact on IGT decision-
making (cf. Hinson et al., 2006; Davies and Turnbull, 2011). This
would be consistent with the observations made by Davies and
Turnbull (2011), and further imply that affective bias within IGT
variants disrupts adaptive shifting of decision behavior in the face
of changing contingencies (i.e., reversal learning).
A notable inference derived from this study surrounds the use
of additional supporting feedback the IGT (and other decision-
making paradigms) often present additional feedback with affec-
tive value (e.g., smiley faces). Such feedback probably consolidates
reinforcement of primary incentive feedback, potentially compli-
cating task interpretation (Shore and Heerey, 2011). However, as
highlighted by Aïte et al. (2013), the use of such feedback may be
unhelpful methodologically, and should therefore be discouraged
in IGT experiments.
In sum, a modest number of studies have manipulated the
affective loading of IGT tasks – with positive and negative
biases, and pre or post-decision inﬂuences. All make it clear
that affective labeling has a substantial affect on performance,
biasing outcome in the direction of the emotion-based inﬂu-
ence. Psychophysiological data showed that anticipatory SCRs did
not appear to be an important (or necessary) indicator of good
decisions. Finally, the awareness of accumulating loss was found to
be critical for adaptive task performance (cf. loss aversion; Weller
et al., 2007, 2010). In demonstrating these effects, the studies show
a useful analogy for the biases of prejudice in everyday decision-
making,while demonstrating theﬂexibility of the IGTas a research
tool.
DISSOCIATING EPISODIC MEMORY AND EMOTION-BASED LEARNING
The remarkably rich literature on the IGThas been a central source
of evidence for the role of the frontal lobes in EBL (e.g., Bechara
et al., 1994, 1997; Rogers et al., 1999; Bowman andTurnbull, 2004).
Indeed, Bechara et al. (1997) original paper especially emphasized
the role of ventromedial pre-frontal cortex (VMPFC). A later set
of studies narrowed the focus, to investigate which speciﬁc frontal
regions (right or left, dorsal or lateral, or ventral or medial) played
the most signiﬁcant role in EBL (e.g., Rogers et al., 1999; Duncan
and Owen, 2000; see Manes et al., 2002; for a detailed discussion).
However, this focus on the frontal lobes, and thus on executive
functions, has potentially ignored the role of other brain areas,
and indeed other classes of psychological ability. An especially
interesting question is the relationship between EBL and episodic
memory. In this section of the paper, wewill present evidence from
lesion (e.g., Damasio et al., 1996; Bechara et al., 1998; Turnbull and
Evans, 2006) and neuroimaging studies (e.g., Patterson et al., 2002;
Fukui et al., 2005), to understand the relationship between these
key psychological systems.
EMOTION-BASED LEARNING AND EPISODIC MEMORY
The neurobiology of EBL is far less well understood than that
mediating episodic memory. However, an introductory survey
of likely brain regions might include a full range of subcor-
tical emotion systems (e.g., Panksepp, 1986, 1998; Davidson
and Irwin, 1999; LeDoux, 2000; Rolls, 2000; Calder et al., 2001;
Phan et al., 2002; Bechara et al., 2003; Berridge, 2003; Patter-
son and Schmidt, 2003; Adolphs et al., 2005), as well as the
connection between these systems and pre-frontal cortex, in
many cases through the VM frontal lobes (Davidson and Irwin,
1999; Bechara et al., 2000a; Bechara, 2004; Anderson et al.,
2006).
Consistent with this, studies also suggest that certain
emotional-learning processes clearly involve medial prefrontal
cortex (e.g., Lane et al., 1997; Reiman et al., 1997). A meta-
analysis of neuroimaging studies, for example, suggest that medial
prefrontal cortex is involved in emotion-based tasks, while the
anterior cingulate and insula are involved when tasks have both
emotional and cognitive load (see Phan et al., 2002).
However, lesion-study and imaging ﬁndings have suggested
that episodic memory systems (Tulving, 1972, 1983) particularly
include the medial temporal lobes and associated structures (e.g.,
Zola-Morgan et al., 1986; McDonald and White, 1993; Schacter
et al., 1995; Nyberg et al., 1996; Schacter et al., 1996; Rugg et al.,
1997; Clark and Squire, 1998). In principle, if EBL and episodic
memory systems are anatomically independent (Tranel andDama-
sio, 1993) it should be possible to disrupt one system and leave the
other intact.
Evidence of such intact EBLhas long been reported, notably in a
classic patient with amnesia (Claparède, 1951). In this well-known
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report, Claparède concealed a pin in his palm, before shaking the
hand of an amnesic patient. On the day following this painful
episode, the patient refused to shake the physician’s hand, despite
having no conscious recollection of the incident (Claparède, 1951;
for review seeEichenbaumandCohen,2001).Modern and system-
atic evidence for the claim comes from thework on the profoundly
amnesic patient, Boswell (Tranel and Damasio, 1990, 1993; Fein-
stein et al., 2010). In the experiment (Tranel and Damasio, 1993),
Boswell engaged in inter-personal encounters with stooges who
played a “good,”“neutral,” or “bad” character in their interactions.
After a week, Boswell was shown sets of photographs that included
the face of one of the individuals, and an unfamiliar face, and was
asked to “Pick the person you would like best?” (p. 83). Naturally,
Boswell had no explicit memory of any of the individuals (tested
with a free or cued recall). However, when asked to make a forced-
choice response, Boswell chose the “good” character almost 80%
of the time, and virtually never chose the bad character (Tranel
and Damasio, 1993).
What of complex learning tasks that also have a reward-based
element? Interestingly, some studies have reported relatively nor-
mal performance by amnesic patients on the Wisconsin Card
Sorting Test (WCST; e.g., Leng and Parkin, 1988; Shoqeirat et al.,
1990), and the probabilistic “Weather Prediction” Task (WPT;
Knowlton et al., 1994, 1996). A plausible hypothesis is that these
tasks also have an emotion-based preference – given that the
experimenter provides “correct” or “incorrect” feedback after each
trial.
COMPLEX EMOTION-BASED LEARNING
Empirical evidence from such studies (see also Johnson et al.,
1985; Tranel and Damasio, 1989, 1990, 1993) thus suggests that
capacity to learn complex emotional valence may be retained in
profoundly amnesic patients. However, many of reports of the
sort described above relate to relatively simple patterns of emo-
tional valence learning (uniformly good versus uniformly bad,
e.g., Tranel and Damasio, 1993; Feinstein et al., 2010), rather
than the more sophisticated patterns of valence which charac-
terize everyday life (e.g., Barraclough et al., 2004). As noted earlier,
it is precisely this complicated pattern of reward and punishment
that the IGT was designed to assess (Bechara et al., 2000a).
In this context, Turnbull and Evans (2006) measured the IGT
performance of a profoundly amnesic patient (SL) who had
suffered a posterior cerebral artery stroke, producing profound
amnesia. On the IGT, SL performed at a comparable level to con-
trols, across a 3-weekperiod,where eachweekhis performancewas
no different to (or in one case much better), than controls. This
learning was also seen despite the fact that the reward-contingency
patternwas shifted between sessions (c.f. Fellows and Farah, 2003),
and that SL was unable to explicitly recall any aspect of the previ-
ous sessions, or recognize the examiner – evidence suggesting that
EBL was preserved.
Thus, complex EBL can remain intact despite profound amne-
sia – though this effect is not universal. Turnbull and Evans (2006)
patient may have been a relatively rare example of such a powerful
dissociation. Gutbrod et al. (2006) report patients with lesions to
the basal forebrain (N = 5) or medial temporal lobe (N = 6) who
performed the IGT. Here two patients did develop a behavioral
preference, though the other nine patients performance remained
at chance. In a further study, Gupta et al. (2009) investigated ﬁve
patients who had bilateral hippocampal damage, and reported
that no patients developed a preference for advantageous over
disadvantageous choice.
Further evidence of preserved implicit EBLhas been reported in
patients with Alzheimer’s disease (AD), another pathology target-
ing the medial temporal lobe (e.g., Winograd et al., 1999; Blessing
et al., 2006). For example, Evans-Roberts and Turnbull (2011)
investigated EBL using the IGT in a patient with dementia of
the Alzheimer’s type – who had profound impairment of both
verbal and visual recent episodic memory, and completed the
Gambling task over three weeks (as in Turnbull and Evans, 2006).
Mr. A again performed consistently above chance, an effect which
seems unlikely to be a result if the more “liberal” response bias of
Alzheimer’s patients (Budson et al., 2006).
An interesting related ﬁnding was the remarkably good per-
formance, in SL’s recognition of paired-associate items (Turnbull
and Evans, 2006). He had comprehensively failed to bring even
a single one of these pairs to conscious recall on any his 40 pre-
vious exposures to the pairs, but nevertheless appeared to have
encoded at least some aspect of a memorial linkage between them.
One explanation might be that he had stored some emotional
marker associated with each pair (“rose–bag,” good; “elephant–
glass,”bad). Another possibilitymight be that the previously tested
items had acquired some positive emotional valence through the
“mere-exposure” effect (Zajonc, 1980; see Turnbull and Evans,
2006 for detailed report of SL).
These data support the growing evidence that there aremultiple
memory systems in the brain, especially supporting an anatomical
and functional dissociation between episodic (e.g., Schacter and
Tulving, 1994; Schacter et al., 2000) and emotion-based memory
(Tranel and Damasio, 1993; Damasio, 1994; Panksepp, 1998; see
EichenbaumandCohen,2001; Phan et al., 2002 for reviews). These
ﬁndings are consistent with performance of amnestic patients in
other non-declarative memory and learning system (e.g., motor
learning). The evidence clearly suggests that EBL systems appear
to encode more sophisticated patterns of valence learning than
have previously been reported, and sustain these over substantial
periods of time, especially in patients with“hippocampal”amnesia
(Turnbull and Evans, 2006).
CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS
These ﬁndings have a range of potentially important clini-
cal implications. For example the Evans-Roberts and Turnbull
(2011) study on preserved EBL in dementia clearly supports
claims from the “person-centered” literature (e.g., Kitwood,
1997; Sabat and Collins, 1999) – that in spite of progres-
sive memory loss (Blessing et al., 2006) patients with AD are
able to learn and retain emotion-based knowledge. Unfortu-
nately, the behavior of many of those who care for patients
with AD is less than optimal (Sabat and Collins, 1999). Such
carers may hold the opinion that they can perhaps speak crit-
ically of such patients, because they will inevitably forget the
experience. The systematic ﬁndings reported above suggest that
patients with AD may retain emotion-based memories, which
may have direct impact on interpersonal relationships with
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patients with memory loss, both in a personal and therapeutic
context.
In addition, the ﬁnding of preserved emotional learning in the
face of profound amnesia is of some interest in the context of
infantile amnesia. It is well established that humans have poor, or
non-existent, episodicmemory for the ﬁrst few years of life (Freud,
1905; Dudycha and Dudycha, 1941; Sheingold and Tenney, 1982
for review see Pillemer and White, 1989). Indeed, there is some
consensus that the earliest adult autobiographical memories are
for events that occurred between 2.5 and 4 years of age (Waldfogel,
1948; Wetzler and Sweeney, 1986; Bruce et al., 2000; MacDonald
et al., 2000).
Some researchers posit that language development plays a
crucial causal role in such childhood amnesia (Allport, 1937;
Schachtel, 1947; Simcock and Hayne, 2002; see also Hayne,
2004 for a review). While, modern neuroscientiﬁc accounts of
the phenomenon stress especially the late development of hip-
pocampal (conscious) memory systems (for further discussion,
see Yovell, 2000; see also Jacobs and Nadel, 1985; Turnbull and
Evans, 2006). However, surely these children are learning from
this period of early childhood? It is now clear that infants do pro-
cess a well-developed capacity for learning of emotional valence in
relation to objects, for example, the quality of attachment rela-
tionships with speciﬁc adults (Winnicott, 1960; Bowlby, 1969;
Ainsworth et al., 1978; Ainsworth, 1985; Fonagy et al., 1991a,b).
The empirical evidence from childhood amnesia studies suggests
EBL systems might be available to infants possibly much before
the hippocampus-based systems develop.
Interestingly, this issue may also be important for our under-
standing of the mechanisms of psychotherapy. It has been
suggested that aspects of the therapeutic alliance might (for exam-
ple) bemediated by emotion-based non-episodicmemory systems
(Turnbull et al., 2006). In principle, this topic could be investi-
gated through the study of neurological patients with amnesia in
a psychotherapeutic setting (Turnbull et al., 2006). In a report of
a patient with severe and stable amnesia, Mr. N (see Kaplan, 1994,
pp. 590–624 for details), there is at least some evidence that the
patient shows therapeutic gains from the interactionwith the ther-
apist (Turnbull et al., 2006). Moore et al. (2012) report a similar
ﬁnding. These preliminary data suggest that during psychother-
apy the interpersonal properties of the therapeutic relationship
may still exist in patients with profound amnesia, suggesting that
the therapeutic alliance may be mediated by a class of memory
system that is separate to that of episodic recall.
CONCLUSION
Summarizing the literature over the last two decades, it is evident
that EBL, in the face of a complex ambiguous decision-making
landscape, is an important psychological process that occurs
rapidly, and is remarkably ﬂexible. This speciﬁc form of learn-
ing contributes to the scientiﬁc understanding of psychological
phenomena such as intuition, prejudice that were long ignored,
and often difﬁcult to deﬁne functionally.
For much of its history, psychological science focused on
rational choice, rather that the less well-speciﬁed and emotion-
based intuitive aspects of human choice (Gilhooly and Murphy,
2005). These later systems are clearly enormously important
for human beings, and this paper has reviewed our growing
understanding of range of important issues: the ﬂexibility of
theses systems, their access to conscious awareness, their rela-
tionship to episodic memory, their role in prejudice, and a
number of potentially important implications for psychother-
apy and care of the elderly. However, this strand of research is
clearly still only in the early stages of development, and we antic-
ipate a range of future discoveries on this scientiﬁcally important
topic.
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